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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1. REPORT NUMBER 6	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 9
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Use of Reserve Component Supply and Service Units during major refugee buildup at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 1975.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's thesis
7. AUTHOR(s) BRADLEY, LEE M., Lt Col, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATSW-SE		12. REPORT DATE 10 Jun 77
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) 10 Lee Michael Bradley		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 75
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 1278p.		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the masters program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) see other side 037 260		

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
ABSTRACT

↓ In May 1975, refugees caused by the fall of the Republic of Vietnam, and Reserve Component supply and service units arrived simultaneously at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. This participant observer thesis is based upon analysis of background material on Vietnam, available documentation on Fort Chaffee, and the active Army task force which supported the refugees.

(Documentation, historical reports, personal observations, evaluation reports, and assorted personal papers used by the author while evaluating those supply and service units were also used. Active Training-1975 provided a special training environment for Reserve Component supply and service units. The combination of normal site support for Reserve Component summer training coupled with requirements caused by the major refugee buildup provided a constantly changing work load that tested the capabilities of these units to the maximum.)

↓ The results indicate that national policy may dictate utilization of Department of Defense resources in support of international refugees and/or domestic displaced persons at a future date. The experience gained from accomplishments of the Reserve Component supply and service units at Fort Chaffee should be evaluated when considering resources for such a mission in the future. ←

USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPLY AND
SERVICE UNITS DURING MAJOR REFUGEE BUILDUP AT
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS, 1975



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1977

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Title of thesis Use of Reserve Component Supply and Service Units During Major Refugee Buildup at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 1975

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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The results indicate that national policy may dictate utilization of Department of Defense resources in support of international refugees and/or domestic displaced persons at a future date. The experience gained from accomplishments of the Reserve Component supply and service units at Fort Chaffee should be evaluated when considering resources for such a mission in the future. The current evaluation system coupled with suggested training for use in emergencies can insure readiness that would be required. Selection of

emergency centers with prepositioned equipment would provide the base in which Reserve Components could provide the service when needed. Active Training-1975 at Fort Chaffee clearly demonstrated that Reserve Component supply and service units have the capability and flexibility to perform multiple site support missions. They are a valuable national resource available for utilization when needed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1975 the author had an opportunity to evaluate United States Army Reserve Component supply and service units under unique circumstances. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, had the dual mission of supporting Reserve Component active duty training simultaneously with supporting refugees from the Republic of Vietnam. The initial Reserve Component supply and service units were responsible for opening the site for Reserve Component training, providing supply and service support for the Reserve Components, and provisioning of site support based on requirements of the refugee encampment. This challenging and unusual mixture of missions allowed the author to evaluate the Reserve Component supply and service units under constantly changing work conditions as close to actual mobilization requirements as possible.

Evaluation of Reserve Components (RC) during active duty training is the responsibility of US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) which provides the objectives of the yearly evaluation of RC units in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2. The primary reason for evaluation is to gain an active Army assessment of readiness, to determine the training program effectiveness, and to provide commanders a comprehensive view of their unit strengths and weaknesses.¹

Active duty Army officers are selected for evaluation duty based on their qualification and knowledge in the areas to be evaluated, and these officers evaluate the units throughout the active training period, usually fourteen days. The unit's performance is used to assess the number of training weeks it would take the unit to reach full operating effectiveness. The evaluating officer also provides comments about the strengths and weaknesses of the unit and recommends a program for the unit's training during the next year. Professional evaluation is vital to the Reserve Component training program because of the role of the reserves in national defense. Units are evaluated according to active Army standards. The key concern is: "Has the unit attained its yearly training objective, and can the unit perform its mission upon mobilization?"² Guidance is issued to unit evaluators by a chief site evaluator who is head of the evaluation team.

Successful evaluation is dependent upon the background of the evaluator and his research of all available material concerning the mission, capabilities, procedures and applicable doctrine for the type of unit being evaluated. The evaluators for the site opening at Fort Chaffee were selected by branch and rank from Army posts located throughout all geographic areas within the continental United States. Following an initial orientation by chief site evaluator Colonel Ace L. Waters, Jr., an evaluation plan was

developed by unit evaluators. The plan included provisions for compliance with any guidance from the chief site evaluation officer. "Guidance for Evaluators" at Fort Chaffee was issued on 5 May 1975 and is included as Appendix 1. The best sources for evaluation of a unit are the Daily Training Evaluation Reports (DTER) and the Report of Yearly Training Evaluation of Reserve Components of the Army. The yearly evaluation provides the Department of the Army with a means of comparing Reserve Component units and personnel to potential active duty mission requirements. The selection of the author for temporary duty as a 5th Army evaluator provided the impetus and the experience to prepare this study.

Under the provisions of Army Regulation 350-1, "The objective of Reserve Component training is to attain the highest levels of individual and unit proficiency that are achievable in a premobilization status."³ This is accomplished through a program of unit training assemblies and a fourteen-day active training period each year. Reserve Component units are scheduled into training sites throughout the United States for their active duty training. Each US Army Reserve (USAR) troop program is required to conduct forty-eight Unit Training Assemblies and to perform a minimum of fourteen days of active training (AT) each year. Each USAR unit is required to meet the same training levels and objectives as the active Army.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas was a little-known Army Reserve Training Center located in western Arkansas near the Oklahoma

border.⁴ It is located eight miles east of Fort Smith, Arkansas. Most of the Fort Chaffee facilities had been in a caretaker status and not utilized extensively since 1959. Although it was a semiactive post with a limited staff, the World War II facility was in excellent condition in 1975 as a result of good planning and administrative leadership. Reserve Component units from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and Oklahoma performed both weekend and summer training duty at Fort Chaffee with great benefit for the maintenance of this old post.

Semiactive Army posts such as Fort Chaffee, which support Reserve Component active training, augment their small staffs with Reserve Component technical service units during active training periods to assist in performing the site support mission. This is accomplished by carefully scheduling site support units such as the 213th Supply and Services Battalion, the 373d Supply and Services Battalion and the 4003d Army Garrison which were evaluated by the author at Fort Chaffee during active training in 1975. These units supplemented the small post staff, and actually performed physical and administrative labor in support of Reserve Component units undergoing active training. While their mission and duties included the daily operation of warehouses, self-service supply stores, and administrative record keeping, the dramatic flight of Southeast Asia refugees significantly increased the workload of these Reserve Component units at Fort Chaffee.

The challenge for United States Army and civilian personnel in 1975 at refugee centers supporting operation

"New Arrivals" is reflected by the following summary:

A year has passed since the tragic fall of South Vietnam and the subsequent great outpouring of Indo-Chinese refugees who fled to escape the incoming communist regime. Almost immediately the exodus began to surge to unprecedented size, and it became clear that most of those refugees would have to be received by the United States. The human magnitude of this flood of refugees had little impact on the average American who lives in a world constantly numbered by record-shattering statistics. But to the military and civilian people of the US Government and private agencies who rallied to meet the incoming tidal wave of humanity, the challenge was awesome. A substantial portion of that challenge fell on the US Army.

Following President Gerald Ford's decision to admit refugees to the United States, the federal government established resettlement centers at Camp Pendleton, California; Elgin Air Force Base, Florida; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. The Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap Resettlement Centers were the responsibility of the United States Army. The United States Marine Corps was responsible for Camp Pendleton and the United States Air Force was responsible for the resettlement center at Elgin Air Force Base.

Refugees requiring resettlement are frequently caused by international events. The Indochina refugees processed through Fort Chaffee in 1975 were the result of the fall of the government of South Vietnam. Previous refugee movements to the United States came from Hungary in 1956, and Cuba in 1959.

Support from the United States government for refugees is normally provided by governmental agencies other than the Department of Defense; however, when vast resources were necessary, as they were during the flight of Indochina refugees in 1975, the Department of Defense was given the mission.

Although active Army provisional units and installations were used to support the refugees from Indochina, the Army recognized that USAR units were a valuable resource for this type mission. This decision provided a worthwhile experience for USAR personnel and resulted in outstanding training and performance of Reserve units. The temporary duty assignment as an evaluator offered the author an opportunity to serve as a participant-observer at Fort Chaffee in 1975. Historical reports have been used in this study, but the personal observations and evaluation reports prepared by the author serve as the primary source for evaluating a Reserve Component supply and service battalion during the major refugee buildup in 1975 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

CHAPTER I NOTES

¹U.S. Army Forces Command, "Reserve Component (U.S. Army) Yearly Training Evaluation," FORSCOM Reg 350-2, Appendix B (Draft), 19 February 1975, p. B-1.

²Disposition Form, "Guidance for Evaluators," 5 May 1975, Department of the Army, Headquarters Fifth U.S. Army Evaluation Board, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, p. 2.

³Department of the Army, Army Training, AR 350-1, 29 October 1973, p. 3-1.

⁴Ft. Sill (Okla.), The Cannoneer, 9 May 1975, p. 1.

⁵Department of the Army, Headquarters 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Civil Affairs Participation in Operation New Arrivals, 6 July 1976, p. iii.

CHAPTER II

VIETNAM - HOMELAND OF THE REFUGEES

The Vietnam refugees who came to the United States in 1975 were placed into a society and environment significantly different from their homeland in Southeast Asia. These people left behind a culture, a government, an environment and a war that had shaped their ideas and their lives. Many of them fled from a country which had experienced 2,000 years of war¹ to the peaceful surrounding of an Army post in western Arkansas. What were some of the geographic and historical factors which had shaped the lives of these Vietnamese refugees?

Geography

Vietnam is one of the world's oldest nations and is located on the eastern edge of the southeast Asian peninsula that thrusts southward between China and India and covers an area of approximately 66,000 square miles. Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam until its fall in April 1975, served as the country's primary port and major industrial center.²

The natural land routes into Vietnam from China run north to south. These land routes coupled with easy access by water enabled the Chinese to dominate Vietnam in its early history. The predominantly Mongoloid component of the Vietnamese race was believed to have moved from southern China into Vietnam and at the same time the Hindu culture moved

into the Mekong Delta from India. Over the years the Chinese influence overcame the Hindu influence.³

The eastern boundary of Vietnam features coast lines along the south China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the Gulf of Siam. The western and northern boundaries wind along mountains and inaccessible regions roughly identified through time by settlement and war. The three major physical regions in South Vietnam that were established in 1954 by the Geneva Convention are the agriculturally rich Mekong Delta, the high plateaus of the Chaine Annamitique, and the narrow coastal strip known as the Central Lowlands.⁴

South Vietnam has a hot humid climate with a mean temperature of about 80°F. The Vietnamese annual rainfall is heavy (Hue, 128 inches; Saigon, 80 inches). Tropical storms called "monsoons" blow generally from the south in the summer and from the north in the winter, and determine both temperature and rainfall. The warm humid climate of Vietnam has produced luxuriant vegetation and extensive tropical forests. The majority of the population lives in the Mekong Delta in rural communities.⁵

Over eighty-five percent of the population is of Vietnamese ethnic origin. The two predominant minorities are the mountain-living Montagnards and the predominantly city-dwelling Chinese. The Vietnamese economy is based primarily on agriculture.⁶

The Mekong Delta is a lowland region situated at the eastern end of the 2,800 mile long Mekong River, which provides

Pacific drainage for the Asian continent. From its mountainous source in Tibet, the river travels through or along the border of six countries before entering the low level plain of the Mekong Delta. The very fertile Mekong Delta in South Vietnam, created by the five branches of the Mekong River, covers approximately 26,000 square miles, of which over 9,000 square miles are cultivated for rice. The Mekong Delta is considered the major rice producing area for all of Asia.⁷

The Chaîne Annamitique, sometimes called the central highlands, forms the border between Vietnam and its neighbors, Laos and Cambodia. It is the southernmost spur of mountains originating in Tibet and China. This mountain range varies in height (5,000 feet to 8,521 feet) and features both mountain and plateau areas. The few settlements in the region are occupied by Montagnards.⁸

The central lowlands of South Vietnam extend along the coast from the Mekong Delta in the south to the demarcation line which partitioned Vietnam in the north. This lowland area is bordered by the sea on the east and the mountainous Chaîne Annamitique on the west. The lowlands are fertile and are used to produce rice and sugarcane. Fishing is good along the coast and provides food for the local population as well as being a marketable product.⁹

History

The first recorded history concerning Vietnam appears in Chinese chronicles.¹⁰ According to the chronicles, a Chinese

general united a group of small competing Vietnamese states into the "Kingdom of Nam Viet." This kingdom included most of North Vietnam and a portion of South Vietnam down to forty miles south of Hue. Nam Viet was overthrown by the armies of the Chinese Han Dynasty around 111 B.C. and remained under the control of Imperial China for 1000 years.¹¹ During this period of Chinese domination, the Vietnamese learned Chinese techniques of agricultural technology, intellectual culture, and methods of administration.¹² Although Chinese rule was not initially oppressive, several Vietnamese revolts caused the Chinese rulers to become more dictatorial and brutal. The Vietnamese finally overcame the Chinese rule in 946 A.D. With the exception of a twenty-year period of reoccupation by China, Vietnam remained independent for the next 900 years.¹³

The Dinh, Ly, and Tran dynasties prevailed during this period of Vietnam independence. The Dinh Dynasty provided the formation of stabilized government institutions. The Ly Dynasty was a period of population growth, territorial expansion, prosperity, cultural development and stability. A strong central government and military organization were created, and Buddhism became the state religion. The Tran Dynasty followed, and it was noted for the rise of Confucianism and the continuous repelling of invasion attempts by the Mongol armies of Kublai Kahn. The Chinese took control of Vietnam again, but were overthrown by the Le Loi Dynasty.

The Le Dynasty lasted for 360 years and featured a peaceful coexistence with China, a cultural resurgence, and acquisition of the Mekong Delta.¹⁴

In 1535, the first European arrived in Vietnam. He was a Portuguese sea captain named Antonio da Faria.¹⁵ The first Vietnam Catholic mission was established in 1615, and Christianity began to spread primarily among the poor. Catholicism had not only a religious but also a cultural impact on Vietnam.¹⁶ In 1802, the Gia-Long rule began and the present name of "Viet-Nam" was used. During this time French military advisors played their initial role in Vietnam.¹⁷

In the mid-1800's, Europe sought to open trade with China. "On August 31, 1858, a Franco-Spanish squadron under Admiral Rigault de Genouilly anchored in front of Tourane." Landing parties followed and Saigon finally fell on 18 February 1859. Within two years the French had taken most of the Mekong Delta and the Chinese signed treaties with France in 1883 and in 1884. The political structure for what became French Indochina was completed in 1900, and fifty years of French administration began.¹⁸ This was a short span of control in comparison with the 1000 years of Chinese occupation Viet-Nam had experienced, "but in its impact upon Viet-Nam's future, those fifty years proved as fateful as the full 1000."¹⁹

"French influence permeated nearly all walks of Vietnamese society."²⁰ The French developed a social order

which mirrored their homeland and was oppressive to the native population. Important government and business management positions were controlled by the French, allowing them to crush the majority of "nationalist" movements that arose. The French purposely curtailed the training of native administrators and extended their system of centralized administration. They developed modern rail and road networks and extended a complex canal irrigation system in Indochina. They also contributed to the intensive cultivation of the Mekong Delta and its much needed rice product. In addition, medical facilities were improved and an educational system utilizing the French language was instituted. The economy under French rule was frequently criticized in Indochina and in Paris for exclusively supporting French interests. The Japanese occupation during World War II destroyed the previous capability of the French to dominate Vietnam.²¹

After World War II, France began looking to overseas possessions for sustenance as a world power; however, the lack of French concessions to nationalist movements, coupled with the rise of Ho Chi Minh, set the stage for the Indochina War. This war continued until July 1954 when the Geneva settlement created North and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was communist controlled, and South Vietnam became a democratic republic backed by western powers, primarily France and the United States.²²

Following the Geneva Accords of 1954, the United States had its first experience with Vietnamese refugees. The United

States Navy assisted in the movement of over one million anticomunist refugees, who were primarily Catholics, from North to South Vietnam.²³

United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II until 1975 has been the subject of much controversy and debate. American actions in Vietnam will undoubtedly be placed in proper historical perspective in the years to come. American military advisors were first sent to Vietnam by President Truman in 1950. At that time, the Communist Viet Minh were waging war against France's colonial army. Following the withdrawal of French military forces after the Geneva Accords of 1954, US advisors began training Saigon's army as the Communist Viet Cong opened warfare in South Vietnam.

The first American soldier became a casualty in December 1961, and President John Kennedy subsequently ordered a buildup of military advisors. In August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the first air assault on North Vietnam in retaliation for the attack on US destroyers by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. In May 1965, the first American combat troops landed in Vietnam, and US troop strength reached its peak of 543,400 in April 1969. During July 1969, the withdrawal of US troops began. Following the signing of the cease-fire accord in Paris in January 1973, American prisoners of war began returning home. The last United States combat forces left Vietnam in March 1973. In April 1975, because of the fall of the South Vietnam

government, the last Americans were evacuated from Vietnam. The United States involvement to preserve freedom in Southeast Asia cost over 150 billion dollars in direct military spending and the lives of nearly 57,000 American servicemen.²⁴

The failure of the United States to appropriate funds for South Vietnam had an "erosive" effect on the Republic, both in the armed forces and the government. The Republic of Vietnam had anticipated giving up certain territories in order to preserve regions vital to the interests of the Republic of Vietnam. The cut-off of funds caused the withdrawal of troops from Pleiku and Kontun provinces. This shifting of troops triggered the flight of the refugees, many of whom did not finish their journey until they reached the United States refugee camps.

During the last forty-five days before South Vietnam fell, the "family syndrome" manifested itself. The Vietnamese, like many oriental cultures, have a deep concern for their families, and the welfare of the family takes priority even over defending the country. Although the marine and airborne troops had families in the Saigon area, the majority of the army families lived in close proximity to where the soldiers worked. Fighting strength disappeared overnight as soldiers left their units in order to help their families flee the area. The 1st ARVN Division, battle-hardened and considered to be the elite division of the Army of South Vietnam, was one of the initial units to lose effectiveness because of the

"family syndrome." This same problem disrupted the operations of the 2d Division of the ARVN south of Danang. Barges sent north to evacuate supplies were frequently filled with refugees. Military sea command ships that were sent to Danang to evacuate materiel were forced to move refugees. The three ARVN divisions that disappeared overnight signaled the eventual downfall of South Vietnam. Airfields were deserted and planes were left on the ground while pilots and crews abandoned their military obligations and sought to protect and rescue their families.²⁵

On 30 April 1975, all evacuation operations ceased. Refugees from the Republic of South Vietnam fled by air, land, and sea to escape the results of a communist takeover of their homeland. These refugees joined the many immigrants who have come to the United States seeking freedom; and like their predecessors, they also brought much of their culture and heritage with them.

CHAPTER II NOTES

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⁵Ibid., p. 12.

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⁹Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 32.

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¹²Handbook for South Vietnam, p. 33.

¹³Ibid., p. 35.

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¹⁵Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, p. 19.

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¹⁷Handbook for South Vietnam, p. 40.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 41-42.

¹⁹Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, p. 25.

²⁰Handbook for South Vietnam, p. 44.

²¹Fred Greene, The Far East (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), pp. 442-444.

²²Ibid., pp. 447-448.

²³"Evacuation Plan: 'A Brave Hope, not a Practical Proposal'," U.S. News and World Report, 21 April 1975, p. 19.

²⁴"The End in Vietnam," U.S. News and World Report, 12 May 1975, p. 16.

²⁵MG Homer D. Smith, "The Final Forty-Five Days in Vietnam," 22 May 1975, transcript copy in possession of Lee M. Bradley.

CHAPTER III

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS AND ORGANIZATION FOR REFUGEE SUPPORT

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas is located only eight miles southeast of the city of Fort Smith, Arkansas which has a population of over 70,000 and is near the center of the border between the states of Arkansas and Oklahoma. Fort Smith has a military heritage which has been continued by Fort Chaffee. The original Fort Smith was built in 1817 on a sandstone point about thirty-five feet above the junction of the Poteau and Arkansas Rivers within present-day Oklahoma.¹ The first fort closed in 1824.

In 1838, the Army returned and built a new Fort Smith and this time it was in the limits of Arkansas. The new post served as a supply base for army garrisons further west. Throughout the nineteenth century, a small community, which eventually became the city of Fort Smith, developed around the military fort. Fort Smith is the county seat of Sebastian County, the smallest county in size within the state of Arkansas, but the second largest in population.

In September 1941, construction of a new post began in the heavily forested countryside of eastern Sebastian County. Many of the present buildings on this post were erected during this period. This post, which trained thousands of servicemen during World War II, has been used

primarily for training Reserve Components in recent years.² Although the post covered over 90,000 acres during the peak period of World War II, it now has only 71,000 acres in use. The post is named for the late Major General Adna R. Chaffee, the first Chief of Armored Forces.

During World War II, the 6th, 14th, and 16th Armored Divisions were trained at Fort Chaffee prior to being deployed overseas where they played a major role in the European campaigns. German prisoners of war were also imprisoned at Fort Chaffee during World War II. After the war, many soldiers were discharged or reassigned from the facilities at Fort Chaffee. The fort was opened and closed several times from 1946 to 1961 when the 5th Armored Division was activated and deactivated. On 1 January 1957, the fort was given the mission of training Reserve Forces Act personnel (six month trainees) prior to their assignment to National Guard or Army Reserve units.

During the Berlin crisis in 1961, the post was reopened as a training center by the US Army Garrison (4002d) Reserve unit from Oklahoma. The 100th Infantry Division (training), a Kentucky Reserve unit, was moved to Fort Chaffee to train troops in basic and advanced infantry tactics. In August 1962, the 100th Infantry Division and other National Guard and Reserve units returned to their home stations. This was the last time a large tent city was used at the fort until Active Training-1975.

On 13 December 1963, the Department of the Army announced that Fort Chaffee would be activated in June 1965. Since July 1965, National Guard and Reserve units have used the post for their summer training. Beginning in 1971, a new emphasis was placed on the training performed by National Guard and Reserve units. Reserve service support units were assigned to Fort Chaffee for their summer active training to assist in operating the post. The units trained by actually operating the post as if it was an active Army installation. Before 1971, reservists simply conducted training in all other phases of military operations. The new policy created the situation which allowed Reserve Component supply and service units to participate in the refugee buildup in 1975.

The present mission of the installation is to provide facilities and support for the summer training of National Guard and Army Reserve units that total approximately 25,000 personnel. Saturated training begins in June and continues through August, and various units--Regular Army, US Air Force, ROTC, Army Reserve and National Guard--are supported on weekends throughout the year. On 12 November 1974, General Order 793 redesignated the post as US Army Garrison, Fort Chaffee (semi-active), Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Fort Chaffee personnel were in the process of preparing for AT-75 when the fall of Vietnam took place.

Following the directives of the Interagency Task Force on Indochina refugees, the Department of the Army notified the Commander, FORSCOM, on 25 April 1975 of the

selection of Fort Chaffee as a refugee processing center. Refugees were scheduled to arrive on 2 May 1975.³ A task force command was established under the control of the State Department and military and civilian personnel began receiving orders on 25 April to proceed to Fort Chaffee to support the refugee operation. Within twelve days Fort Chaffee became a temporary city, the ninth largest in Arkansas. The refugee population peaked on 24 June 1975 at 25,055 and by 20 December 1975, when the center closed, over 50,000 refugees had passed through Fort Chaffee.

Task Force New Arrivals was the organization responsible for refugee operations at Fort Chaffee. This task force was a joint venture that combined military and civilian agencies. The Department of Defense; the Department of State; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the Department of Labor had responsibilities in Task Force New Arrivals.

Following receipt of notification that Fort Chaffee would be a refugee relocation center, planning began at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the parent post for Fort Chaffee. During the initial planning sessions, the decision was made to continue Reserve Annual Training but to move those units into tents. The refugees were scheduled to occupy the main post barracks that were originally assigned to house Reserve Component personnel.

Following receipt of guidance from US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the commander at Fort Sill on 27 April

published "OPLAN New Life - Chaffee."⁴ The mission statement was: "Fort Sill establishes an RVN refugee support center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas to accommodate 20,000 to 25,000 refugees for a period of 90 days or more." Between 27 April and 2 May, operational planning and receipt of the initial shipment of supplies occurred. During this period active Army troops, who later became Task Force New Arrivals, arrived at Fort Chaffee.

On 2 May 1975, the first airplane load of refugees arrived at Fort Smith Airfield. Between 4 May and 12 May 1975, the refugee population increased from approximately 1,000 to 20,988. On 8 May 1975, the advance party from the 213th Supply and Service Battalion arrived at Fort Chaffee, and two days later the first Reserve Component units completed their arrival at Fort Chaffee for two weeks annual training. By 17 May 1975, over 3,000 Reserve Component troops were training at Fort Chaffee. An extract of major events during the organization of Task Force New Arrivals is at Appendix 2.⁵

An analysis of the Headquarters New Arrivals After Action Report neglects to recognize the contributions made by Reserve Component supply and service units at Fort Chaffee. The After Action Report only mentions the accomplishments of the Regular Army and combined governmental agency task force. They are given credit for the accomplishments of the Reserve Component supply and service units, i.e., swimming pool operations and gymnasium operations.⁶

The initial troop list for Operation New Life-Chaffee detailed active duty units to Fort Chaffee from Forts Carson, Campbell, Benning, Bragg, Leonard Wood, Sill, and Hood.⁷ A list of the initial units is at Appendix 3.

From 29 April until 21 May 1975, the 46th Support Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina was the major military command and control organization for Task Force New Arrivals at Fort Chaffee. The group had to adjust its organization for the refugee support task of control and coordination. When BG James W. Cannon and his personnel arrived from Fort Sill, they were merged with the group into the military component of Task Force New Arrivals. The civilian component of Task Force New Arrivals appeared later and this further complicated the initial organization of the civilian/military task force. One of the few references to Reserve Components made within all five volumes of the After Action Report appeared in the "Executive Summary":

One of the principal coordination difficulties was moving some 7,200 reservist personnel scheduled for annual training 1975 from barracks to concrete pads where tents were erected. The location was off of the main post, and movement to the new location created some initial disruption, congestion, and traffic jams.⁸

The cumulative refugee summary for April and May reported 27,374 refugee arrivals and 3,601 refugee departures. The May 1975 average active Army daily strength was 1,981; active Air Force, 21; and civilian, 69.5. The daily strength total at Fort Chaffee for Operation New Arrivals was 2,635.

When the refugee operation began, the Fort Chaffee Directorate for Industrial Operations (DIO) was staffed with a very small nucleus of trained supply personnel, and on 1 July 1975 the Task Force and US Army garrison staffs were integrated.

CHAPTER III NOTES

¹Herbert M. Hart, Old Forts of the Southwest (Seattle: Superior Publishing Co., 1964), p. 87.

²Western Arkansas is Bonanza Land, n.p., n.d.

³Department of the Army, Headquarters New Arrivals After Action Report, n.d., Vol. I, p. I-III-1-3.

⁴Ibid., I, p. I-III-1.

⁵Ibid., I, p. I-III-4.

⁶Ibid., I, II, III.

⁷Ibid., II, p. B-4-6.

⁸Ibid., II, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE 213TH S&S BATTALION AT FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS DURING ACTIVE TRAINING 1975

The 213th Supply and Service (S&S) Battalion (Bn) is a United States Army Reserve unit from Wausau, Wisconsin. Wausau is located close to the center of Wisconsin. The fifty-six officers and enlisted personnel present for active training at Fort Chaffee in 1975 were from homes in Wisconsin, with the exception of one Captain, who was from a suburb of Chicago, Illinois. Although over forty-three percent of the unit's personnel are from the Wausau area, some key personnel commute from Chetek and Eau Claire in the west, Chippewa in the north, and from Chicago in the south. The civilian occupations of the members of the 213th S&S Bn were diverse; among the careers were a school superintendent, school teachers, a bank executive, salesmen, engineers, sheriffs, and a police sergeant.¹ A roster of occupations is at Appendix 4.

The 213th S&S Bn is organized under Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 29-146G for a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Supply and Service Battalion. The mission of such a unit is "to command and control assigned or attached direct and/or general support supply and service organizations."² The effective span of control for a supply and

service battalion is from two to six companies. These companies are usually supply and service units; but as in the case of the 213th S&S Bn at Fort Chaffee, they may be a mixture of other technical service and administrative units. The battalion is organized to provide the necessary command, staff planning, and technical control over mission activities of subordinate units. Management centers or augmentation may be necessary depending on non-supply and service missions and units assigned.³

An advance party from the 213th S&S Bn arrived at Fort Chaffee by a military van and several privately owned vehicles on Thursday, 8 May 1975. The advance party was to coordinate work requirements with the permanent party at Fort Chaffee. In addition, the men were to prepare for the arrival of the main body of the 213th S&S Bn troops by commercial airplane at Fort Smith on Saturday, 10 May 1975. All of the personnel of the 213th S&S Bn were assigned to live in a tent city instead of in billets on the main post. The tent city was located on the military reservation about two miles west of the main post. Fort Chaffee had not witnessed such an extensive use of tents since 1962..

The advance party joined a small work detail from the main post and pitched the general purpose medium tents, which became a home away from home for the 213th S&S Bn. On Friday, 9 May 1975, the day before the main body of the unit arrived, the tents were blown down by high winds from

a tornado. This severe windstorm leveled the tent city at approximately 9:00 p.m. and caused some damage in the nearby community of Barling, Arkansas.

The main body of the 213th S&S Bn left Central Wisconsin Airport on Saturday, 10 May 1975, at 7:55 a.m. and arrived at Fort Smith Airport at approximately 2:40 p.m. The members of the unit were transported to the tent city on military buses. When the unit arrived, the personnel found the advance party struggling to pitch the tents that had been blown down the previous night. The tent city was quickly reconstructed by unit personnel, and the remainder of the weekend was spent organizing the unit to perform its mission during the next two weeks.⁴ Reserve Component units served as subordinate units of the 213th S&S Bn for this active training period. The Supply and Service Company of the 170th Support Battalion and the 346th Ammunition Company were assigned to the 213th as its basic operational units for Active Training (AT-75).

The 346th Ammunition Company is organized under TOE 9-17G for an ordnance ammunition company. This Reserve Component unit from Louisiana performed efficiently in handling initial ammunition requirements for AT-75 Reserve Component support at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. The mission of this company was to establish and operate an ammunition supply facility that could receive, store, and issue conventional, chemical, biological, and radiological munitions. During AT-75,

the 346th Ammunition Company opened, stocked, and operated the Fort Chaffee ammunition supply point. The company's performance exceeded the Ordnance Corps standards of tons handled each day by 150 to 200 percent. Although the unit did not contribute directly to refugee support, its exceptional performance allowed the 213th to concentrate its managerial capabilities on the supply and service area which had a vital impact on refugee support.

The Supply and Service Company of the 170th Support Battalion from Detroit, Michigan, furnished the supply and service work force for the 213th's assigned responsibilities. The personnel from this urban-based unit were primarily black "blue collar" workers. The 170th Supply and Service Company furnished the work force within the ration breakdown area for both cold and dry storage warehouses. Food for both the Reserve Components and the refugees was handled by these reservists from Detroit. These "motor city men" also labored in the expendable and nonexpendable warehouses, the post training aids facility, the clothing issue facility, and the firing range communication support operation. Without the hard work of these reservists, the weapons and equipment pool of Fort Chaffee could not have accomplished the receipt and issue of weapons from Fort Sill which supported a major reserve unit exercise less than one week after opening of Active Training 75. This supply and service company accomplished many unique missions at Fort Chaffee for which it

had neither the organization nor the trained personnel. Two of these unique missions were the opening and operation of the post swimming pool and the post gymnasium.⁵

The unit mission for the 213th S&S Battalion was to open the supply and service site support and the ammunition supply point to support 600 Reservists and National Guardsmen the first week, and to support an additional 2,000 Arkansas Guardsmen the second week. Unknown to the unit before it arrived at Fort Chaffee was its requirement to support the rapidly expanding Vietnamese refugee population on the main post. During the first two days that the entire unit was on post (Sunday and Monday), the 213th accomplished the physical move of the quartermaster sales store from the main post area to another area outside the refugee encampment on post.⁶

The first weekend at Fort Chaffee allowed the 213th S&S Bn to coordinate, organize and assign responsibilities to staff sections and subordinate units for logistical areas. The battalion had planned well for its active training at Fort Chaffee, and its personnel demonstrated the ability to make necessary changes in the operational environment when the mission of the unit changed.

At 8:00 a.m. on Monday, 12 May, a logistical operations center began functioning in Building 241 in the site support area. This center was the heart of the supply and service mission. All site support missions assigned to the unit were directed and effectively controlled from the center.

The logistical operations under the 213th S&S Battalion included two-shift operations in warehouses, and a one-shift operation in the ration breakdown area, in the self-service supply store and in the individual reserve replacement clothing issue warehouse.

The logistical control center became the hub of Fort Chaffee site support. The threefold mission of site opening, Reserve Component support, and refugee support was coordinated primarily by this center. The daily logistical briefings, which included accomplishments and projections, served as a key to effective command and for evaluation.

Under command of Major(P) Robert R. Crase, the 213th S&S Battalion worked two shifts a day to accomplish their mission. The long hours were necessary to handle refugee requirements for rations, cots, sheets and blankets.⁷ The final consolidated logistical recapitulation for the entire period was provided by the 213th S&S Battalion:

LOGISTICAL RECAP

Supply & Service provided by the 213th S&S Bn during AT-75 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

Class II & X Items (multiple locations)

Items issued	136,638
Items received	71,347

Class V (Ammunition)

Tons received	638
Tons handled	1,332
Tons issued	133

Tons rewarehoused	512
Residue returned	14 tons
Weapons Pool	422 manhours
Self-Service Supply Store	
Requisitions processed	73
Items issued	491
Items received	195
Individual Reserve Replacements	
Personnel processed	46
Items issued	2,593
Items received	49
Items inventoried	700
Dry Storage	
Rice received	125,800 lbs
Rice issued	99,842 lbs
Swimming Pool	
Number of personnel utilizing facility	1,343
Field House	
Number of personnel utilizing facility	1,239
Items of equipment processed by hand receipt	434
Refugee Population	
Lowest count - 8 May 1975	8,480
Highest count - 20 May 1975	23,718

Classes of supply⁸ are defined at Appendix 5. Secondary items (Class II) of equipment are authorized by allowance tables. Secondary items include expendables and consumables. Class X is nonmilitary support materiel which became a key item because of refugee support. A large number of Class II and X items handled by the battalion were personal support items for refugees; blankets, cots, etc.

Ammunition, weapons pool support, self-service supply, individual reserve replacement support and swimming pool operations were in direct support of Reserve Component and permanent party personnel. Approximately twenty percent of the Class II and X items and fifty percent of gymnasium support was for Reserve Components. The refugee population at Fort Chaffee increased dramatically from 8,480 on 8 May to 23,718 during the training period of the 213th S&S Bn and its attached units. Over eighty percent of the large amount of Class II and X items received and issued, and all of the rice received and issued was in support of the Indochina refugees. During a six-day period of multishift operations, 98,485 issues and receipts of Class II and X items were made; much of this was bedding requirements for the rapidly increasing refugee population.

The situation in tent city, the home of the reserve units, was unique. The 213th S&S Bn and its principal subordinate unit, the 170th S&S Company, were located side by side. Personnel from both units began a site improvement program during their very limited off-duty time. What previously had been concrete slabs in a large open area became a thriving community of soldiers. To complement the tents, unit signs, bulletin boards, wooden fencing, shaving basins, flower boxes, portable latrines and even a foot bridge between the battalion and its supply and service company were constructed. The bridge was necessary because of storms that swept tent city between 8 May and 24 May 1975.

The formal opening of the bridge was accomplished on Friday evening of the first week of training and was the pride and joy of those hard working reservists from Wisconsin and Michigan. "Friendship Bridge" was dedicated by officers and key enlisted personnel from both units and included ribbon cutting and a champagne bottle. The utility of this bridge enabled men from each unit to move throughout the area without getting muddy and, as they predicted, the craftsmanship enabled the bridge to stand until the last Reserve Component site support units had been moved out of tent city.⁹

The opportunity to evaluate the 213th S&S Battalion and its primary operating company, the 170th S&S Company, revealed an unusual situation for insights and observations. The situation at Fort Chaffee was as close to full mobilization as a supply and service unit can experience. The predominantly Black S&S Company from an urban area and the predominantly White S&S Battalion from a rural area worked and lived together in harmony with unusually high morale. The situation of working long hours with quickly visible results under a daily changing mission environment challenged the full capabilities of both units. The swimming pool offered a unique example of teamwork. Five individuals from the 170th S&S Company, who had joined the unit during the Vietnam War and had only to complete AT-75 to finish all military obligations, volunteered to open and run the post swimming pool. The pool, through their efforts, opened

fifteen days earlier than the post had planned. The olympic sized pool required cleaning and repairing before undergoing engineer and medical inspections. This was accomplished by these men within a few days and the pool was operated twelve hours a day through the entire period. When preplanned emergency calls to get them home early came in, they said: "Tell the wife (or girl friend) to quit calling. I have a job to finish at Fort Chaffee!"

The chief site evaluator commented that the duty performance of the 213th S&S Bn was equal to any active duty unit of that type he had ever observed.¹⁰ The narrative extract of the author's final evaluation report is at Appendix 6.

The Supply and Service Battalion that took over the mission from the 213th S&S Bn was the 373d S&S Bn from Beaumont, Texas. The Supply and Service Company that furnished its primary work force was based in Oklahoma. The 373d S&S Bn adapted well to the mission and the handoff of responsibilities from the unit going home to Wisconsin. The unit coming in from Texas could only be termed "professional." This successful turnover of a very active and fluctuating mission work load without degradation emphasizes the feasibility of Reserve Component S&S units supporting civil affairs/disaster requirements in addition to their normal mission.

During the two weeks that the 373d S&S Bn operated as the focal point for site support, it assumed three new

logistical missions not previously assigned to the 213th S&S Bn. These missions were previously performed by active duty personnel. The assumption of the Class III (MOGAS) and aviation fuel points for Fort Chaffee were in support of Reserve Components, permanent post personnel and Task Force New Arrivals. The special Class I supplemental ration point for refugees was assumed in addition to the ration point missions previously accomplished by the 213th S&S Bn. Supplemental rations for refugees consisted of special items for normal Vietnamese diets. The laundry service assumed by the 373d S&S Bn was entirely in support of refugees. This unit, like its predecessor, showed the ability to make day-to-day changes in labor, controls, and procedures as missions assigned fluctuated or changed. As the 213th had previously discovered, logistical support at Fort Chaffee Active Training-75 provided a special training environment for the 373d S&S Bn that few US Army Supply and Service Units will ever receive.¹¹

CHAPTER IV NOTES

¹Department of the Army, Headquarters 213th S&S Bn, Annotated Manning Table, 13 May 1975.

²Department of the Army, MTOE 29, 146G, 22 Apr 1964, p. 3.

³Department of the Army, FM 29-3-1, Direct Support Supply and Service in Theaters of Operation, November 1972, p. 3-2.

⁴Lee M. Bradley, "Daily Training Evaluation Report," 213th S&S Bn., 12-13 May 1975.

⁵Lee M. Bradley, "Daily Training Evaluation Report," 170th S&S Co., 15-16 May 1975.

⁶Lee M. Bradley, "Daily Training Evaluation Report," 213th S&S Bn., 12-13 May 1975.

⁷Fort Chaffee (Ark.), Helping Hand, 16 May 1975, p. 3.

⁸Department of the Army, FM 101-10-2, Staff Officers Field Manual, Organizational, Technical and Logistic Data Extracts of Non-divisional Tables of Organization and Equipment, July 1975, p. A-1.

⁹Fort Chaffee (Ark.), Helping Hand, 20 May 1975, p. 6.

¹⁰Report of Yearly Evaluation of Reserve Components of the Army, 213th S&S Bn, Section B, May 1975.

¹¹Report of Yearly Evaluation of Reserve Components of the Army 373d S&S Bn, Section B, June 1975.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Evaluation of Reserve Component supply and service units at Fort Chaffee in 1975, during the major refugee buildup, offers evidence that the Army's evaluation system for Reserve Components is an effective and valid process. During each training year Reserve Component units are evaluated at their home station through reports of advisors, general inspections, and various testing processes. Further evaluation is performed by active Army evaluators during two weeks of active duty each year. These active Army evaluators bring their personal experience and knowledge of how similar active duty units perform their missions. They are also able to perform this evaluation without the personal involvement which is present when an advisor lives in the same community and advises the unit year around. The Department of the Army should continue to select carefully evaluators who are experienced and technically competent. The evaluators at Fort Chaffee were capable and knowledgeable individuals. They quickly learned the mission of the unit being evaluated and performed admirably. If evaluators of lesser rank and experience had been selected, the effectiveness of active training evaluation might have decreased significantly.

US Army Reserve Supply and Service Battalions are generally organized under TOE 29-146G, and have the mission "to command and control assigned or attached direct and/or general support supply and service organizations." The

capability of units assigned to this battalion influence its ability to accomplish a special mission. The S&S Battalions at Fort Chaffee demonstrated that they could also command and control other than supply and service units.. Administrative and ammunition units can both be efficiently handled by the Supply and Service Battalion Headquarters. The limiting factor in controlling assorted combat service support and administrative units is technical expertise. This can easily be accommodated by providing a small augmentation to the headquarters staff of personnel having the necessary knowledge and experience.

The procedure of utilizing Reserve Component supply and service units to supplement the small staffs of semi-active Army posts in accomplishing the day-to-day mission requirements was validated by the experience at Fort Chaffee. With the recent renewed emphasis on training Reserve Components, the utilization of site support units in the actual operation of post functions has not only furnished a meaningful mission, but has undoubtedly improved the technical training of site support units. The knowledge of garrison operations has increased the effectiveness of these units. Scheduling weekend duty, in addition to working directly during the summer with post staffs, increases the effectiveness of training. The ability of the first two S&S Battalions at Fort Chaffee to perform so efficiently during the rapidly changing environment of AT-75 was made possible only by training and extensive

prior knowledge of normal operations.

In addition to supply and service units, Reserve Component combat service support units have the potential to perform emergency-type services. The troop list of active Army units in Operation New Life-Chaffee (Appendix 3) include adjutant general units, engineer units, transportation units, military police units, medical units, and supply and service units. Generally, units similar to these can be found in the Reserve Component troop structure. The experience at Fort Chaffee proved the capability of RC supply and service units to perform both normal and emergency support-type missions. Other Reserve Component administrative and combat service support units should be able to perform as well, if they are trained and motivated.

Selection and retention of strategically located posts, camps, and stations, either semi-active or closed, for use as emergency centers provides the nation a disaster resource. These emergency centers not only utilize posts, camps and stations not currently in operation, but also boost local economies. Semi-active installations such as Fort Chaffee and Camp McCoy have proven themselves to be valuable Reserve Component training centers. If Fort Chaffee had not been kept in good condition for Reserve training, it could not have been used very easily for the Vietnam refugees. The retention of these "emergency centers" incur administrative expenses for annual upkeep, but they serve as training

centers and provide facilities which can be easily opened in emergency situations.

Equipment should be prepositioned at emergency centers throughout the United States. The prepositioning of equipment allows a unit to fly to its active duty station, as did the 213th S&S Bn, without having to convoy across long distances for a considerable period of time. Prepositioning all necessary equipment to operate a post, camp, or station as an emergency center allows RC units to commute from long distances. A small administrative staff can maintain prepositioned vehicles with administrative and organizational maintenance-type services. Any shortages of the Reserve Component's equipment at its home station can be overcome by having prepositioned equipment at emergency centers.

Reserve Component training should include preparation for commitment in domestic and international emergencies as well as military operations. For example, the processing of Class I (food), whether in support of military or domestic emergencies is basically the same. Medical services are essentially the same whether for military or civilian injuries. The training and utilization of Reserve Component combat service support units for both military and domestic crises adds not only realism and adventure to training, but also improves the public image and increases the number of recruits in the Reserve Component's home community. The training level of many Reserve Component units may not be sufficient

to allow them to perform as well as the site support units at Fort Chaffee. This could occur, but a solution is possible. The training and/or knowledge of key individuals within a unit can be determined by education credentials and their ability to perform successfully on tests. Positions should be identified where either the incumbent or positions unfilled need assistance. Individuals in the non-unit affiliated reserve program can be identified and used to fill the personnel shortages of RC site support units. These individuals can be identified by the same methods used to determine the training and knowledge level of the RC unit's personnel.

Plans should be made to use Reserve Component units for missions within their capability for extended periods of time. These units can be phased in two-week increments, as the site support units were rotated at Fort Chaffee. Phasing of units requires careful planning, but pays significant dividends in contributions to the nation by its citizen soldiers and the saving of active duty manpower frequently diverted to provisional units such as Task Force New Arrivals. Based on the experience of evaluating Reserve Component units at Fort Chaffee, a significant amount of the active military manpower used in Task Force New Arrivals could have been furnished by Reserve Component resources. Plans and standing operating procedures must be sufficiently detailed and understandable to allow the continuous transfer of Reserve Component missions.

United States Army Reserve Units have contingency plans which provide for mobilization for defense contingencies. The utilization of reserve units to run emergency support missions could limit their availability for national defense contingencies for which they are organized and trained.

There are a number of Reserve Component garrison-type units scattered throughout the United States. These units should be identified and closely associated with a particular post. A study should be conducted to determine the adequacy of such units and to determine those units which could be assigned to augment them in order to permit complete operational control of a post, camp, or station. There should be a sufficient number of these garrison units and associated site support supplemental units to run an Army installation for a period of six months, rotating units in and out every two weeks. This would allow an emergency center to operate exclusively with RC units. The national and local political implications of long active duty tours by RC units could be avoided.

Army Reserve Units, when truly challenged by a meaningful mission, will display good morale, work performance and racial harmony. The environment at Fort Chaffee created a laboratory in which to verify this assertion. The two initial site support units from different geographic areas, work environments, and ethnic and racial backgrounds performed an outstanding mission.

Even more important was the way these units were drawn together and the cooperation displayed at both the work and tent sites. The multiple shift work, with almost daily feedback, the building of "Friendship Bridge" and the mutual assistance in such common endeavors as repitching the tents several times after tornado winds had created an emergency were noteworthy. What it really means is that American soldiers continue to pull together to accomplish a worthwhile mission or support a worthy cause.

The Reserve Component 346th Ammunition Company consistently exceeded the unit's stated capability of tonnage handled per day. This not only added to the accolade for RC units at Fort Chaffee, but presents a basic question: Are data from Reserve Component units' operations considered in establishing standards for US Army units? The Department of the Army should reexamine established standards using the performance of all units, including Reserve and National Guard, that perform a certain type of mission. Just how valid is the present technical estimate of unit capability for ammunition companies?

Refugees from internal crises and displaced persons from domestic emergencies have frequently required the United States government to provide service and support. This support has sometimes been minor, but in some cases, such as the Cuban and Vietnamese, it has been extensive. The provision of sites and the training of units for this purpose is both

logical and humanitarian. People needing help in times of crisis, whether caused by war or national disaster, will continue to be a problem for the United States government. Planning for such contingencies should incorporate the lessons learned from Active Training-75 at Fort Chaffee.

National policy may dictate utilization of Department of Defense resources in support of international refugees and/or domestic displaced persons at a future date. The experience gained from accomplishments of the Reserve Component supply and service units at Fort Chaffee should be evaluated when considering resources for such a mission in the future. Other Reserve Component combat service support and administrative units also have a potential for use in this environment. The current evaluation system coupled with suggested training for use in emergencies can insure the readiness that would be required. Selection of emergency centers with prepositioned equipment would provide the base in which Reserve Components could provide the service when needed. Active Training-1975 at Fort Chaffee clearly demonstrated that Reserve Component supply and service units have the capability and flexibility to perform multiple site support missions. In a rapidly changing environment, these citizen-soldiers were ready and able to perform all missions assigned. They are a valuable national resource available for utilization when needed.

APPENDIXES

DISPOSITION FORM

APPENDIX 1

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

ATZR-B-EVAL TM

Guidance for Evaluators

TO
Evaluation Teams
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

FROM
Executive Officer

DATE
5 May 75

PAGE 1

1. References:

- a. FORSCOM Cir 350-4
- b. FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 350-1, Anx C, with changes
- c. FORSCOM Suppl 1 to AR 350-1, App II, Anx C
- d. 5A Suppl 1 to AR 350-1, App II, Anx C
- e. 5A Cir 135-24

2. Plan to meet your units upon their arrival, acquaint yourself with the Unit Commander, unit advisor (if present), and other key personnel. Inform the Unit Commander when evaluation will begin. Evaluation normally begins on Monday of the first week of AT and terminates at noon on Wednesday of the second week. If the unit is conducting an ATT, the entire ATT period will be evaluated. Evaluation periods will cover a 24 hour period except for the first and last day of training. Evaluation periods will be established by the Site Chief Evaluator to insure that the unit receives 8 Daily Training Evaluation Reports (DTER) during the evaluation period when possible. You will complete the front side only of the DTER daily using the back portion as a guide.

3. Ask the unit for a copy of their Unit Training Schedule, ATP, SOP, Mission Statement and other pertinent training publications as deemed appropriate to complete the evaluation report. Immediately check the training schedule to insure that at least 88 hours of training in appropriate ATP subjects will be conducted during AT. Parades and ceremonies, issue and turn in of equipment, preparation for return to home station, payment of troops, and other administrative functions should be reflected in addition to the total 88 hour minimum requirement. Units have been encouraged to schedule training hours in excess of the minimum requirement to insure that maximum ATP training can be accomplished during AT. Qualification and familiarization firing will be conducted during AT only when IDT facilities will not permit such training. In the event the training schedule does not contain the required 88 hours of training, immediately call this to the attention of the Unit Commander and the Site Chief Evaluator. The unit may schedule additional training by publishing appropriate changes. Units are authorized not more than 10 hours of Commander's Time during AT. Commander's Time is included in the 88 hour minimum. The number of hours permissable ~~(to)~~ ^(to) ~~be~~ ^{be} extracted from its ATP/UTP.

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4. Have the unit provide information necessary to complete the unit's closing report. This is a one time report and will be submitted to Evaluation Board Headquarters NLT 12 noon on the first Monday following arrival of the unit on post. Have the unit prepare one (1) pencil draft copy of page 1 and 2 of the FORSCOM Form 1-R dated 1 Jan 1975. This copy will be submitted to Evaluation Board Headquarters NLT 12 noon on Tuesday of the first week of training. This report will be rechecked for accuracy by the Administrative Officer and returned to the unit ASAP for final typing. Detailed instructions for completion of this form and a sample copy are included in FORSCOM Cir 350-4, Appendix H, which is provided in your evaluator packet.

5. Units will be evaluated according to Active Army standards. Evaluators should concentrate on tactical, technical, and maintenance activities. Keep in mind that the evaluation effort is directed towards answering the questions, "Has the unit attained its yearly training objective, and can the unit perform its mission upon mobilization?" This information is contained in 5A Letter, Subject: Approved Training Level Objectives and ATT for TY 73-74, dated 18 Jan 74 (for NG and USAR units). You, as an evaluator, must determine the answer to these questions and report your unbiased and comprehensive opinion on the FORSCOM Form 1-R. You will be responsible for completion of Page 3. DTER's serve as an excellent source of information for completion of the FORSCOM Form 1-R. Guidance for completion of Part III, Page 3 are included in FORSCOM Cir 350-4. The draft copy of the 1-R, Page 3 will be submitted to the Site Chief Evaluator by noon Tuesday of the second week of the evaluation period to be finalized.

6. Special emphasis areas for evaluation:

a. Organizational maintenance. Review and evaluate organizational maintenance of equipment during each unit's training period. Reflect maintenance level in each unit's final rating. Maintenance ratings will be based on scheduled maintenance, technical inspection on both organic and ESC/ATEP equipment loaned from site support, and care and cleaning to include weapons. Scheduled supervised motor stables is one indication of unit emphasis on maintenance. A check of DD Form 314 also serves as a good indicator. The unit individual weapon cards should be carefully checked for proper signatures and security of weapons should be closely observed.

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b. Proper integration, use, training, administration, and logistical support of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR Fillers). Filler personnel will be administered in the same manner as newly assigned unit members. In-processing and utilization in appropriate MOS positions should be carefully observed.

c. Proper requisition, segregation, transport, use, police, and turn-in of ammunition. Carefully observe and evaluate the handling of all ammunition and its expenditure. Deliberate waste of ammunition will be cause for an unsatisfactory rating.

d. Check field sanitation to insure that Reserve Component Units are meeting Department of the Army standards in construction and adequacy of latrines and sumps as outlined in FM 21-10. Check for presence of toilet paper, general cleanliness, police and sanitation of the latrine area.

e. Closely observe morale and attitudes of personnel of evaluated units. A short comment will be included on the completed FORSCOM Form 1-R, Part III concerning this area.

8. Additional instructions:

a. Be prepared to brief Unit Commanders daily. Give them a copy of the DTER to substantiate your briefing. Point out any unsatisfactory or noteworthy areas observed. Evaluate command and staff actions in correcting noted problem areas.

b. Set the example in appearance and morale. Your uniform should be neat and immaculate. Remember you represent the Fifth Army Commander and are evaluating units based on Active Army standards. Your uniform will be the same as that of the evaluated unit.

c. Wear evaluator armbands only when actually engaged in evaluation duty. Wearing armbands while drinking at the club or evaluation of units with alcohol on your breath may be the cause for censure of you and the Evaluation Board and may cause considerable embarrassment to all concerned at Fort Chaffee.

d. Do not interfere with a unit's training unless some unsafe act warrants your immediate intervention. You may provide guidance and assistance to improve training, but your primary mission is to evaluate - not to command.

ATZR-B-EVAL TM

5 May 75'

SUBJECT: Guidance for Evaluators

e. Insure timely-submission of required reports. Check to insure that you have signed all reports and that no problems remain prior to your departure. You must furnish one copy of Page 1 thru 3 of the FORSCOM Form 1-R (completed) to the evaluated unit prior to the unit's departure.

f. Sign out here and at Building 242. Check with the Billeting Office (Bldg. 1377) and pay your BOQ bill. Turn armbands, clipboards, and USAAMC Pam 385-2 into Evaluation Board Headquarters prior to your departure.

/s/ Ruvian D. Hendrick, Jr.
RUVIAN D. HENDRICK, JR.
MAJ, FA
Executive Officer

APPENDIX 2

EXTRACT OF MAJOR EVENTS

An extract from Chronology of Events from Part III (Executive Summary) to Volume I - General to after action report: New Arrivals - Chaffee follows:

- 25 Apr 75 Commander, FORSCOM, notified by Department of the Army of the selection of Fort Chaffee as a Refugee Relocation Center.
- FORSCOM OPLAN New Arrivals - Chaffee published. Military and civilian personnel began receiving orders to proceed to Fort Chaffee in support of the refugee operations.
- 27 Apr 75 Mr. Billy G. Roberts, along with Fort Chaffee Primary Staff, attended briefing at Fort Sill for MG David Ott and the Fort Sill staff.
- General Ott issued definitive guidelines to be used for the refugee operation, i.e., move Reserve Component Annual Training troops into tentage and house refugees in barracks buildings. Fort Sill staff took immediate action to supply Fort Chaffee with all supplies and equipment required to accomplish both missions on an as required basis.
- Fort Sill OPLAN New Arrivals-Chaffee published.

Emergency Operation Centers were activated at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Sill.

Eleven (11) military and 120 civilians comprised the Fort Chaffee Permanent Party.

28 Apr 75 BG James W. Cannon, Task Force Commander, and COL Thomas E. Mullins, Deputy Task Force Commander, arrived and were briefed, toured the installation, and approved the proposed areas to accommodate the mission.

Warning order received by Headquarters, 46th Support Group, Fort Bragg, to deploy to Fort Chaffee. The Fort Sill DIO, Purchasing and Contracting Representative arrived at Fort Chaffee to provide authority for direct purchases from local vendors and make direct coordination for procurement actions which exceeded her authority.

29 Apr 75 46th Support Group arrived at Fort Chaffee to support resettlement program.

Supplies and equipment began arriving at Fort Chaffee from Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

The 47th Field Hospital arrived from Fort Sill. The Fort Sill DFAE's Ordering Officer arrived to assist the Fort Chaffee DIO in expediting supply transactions pertaining to engineer type supplies and equipment.

30 Apr 75 FORSCOM and 5th Army representatives arrived to review plans and progress for refugee operation

and the establishment of a "Tent City" to accommodate 7,500 Reserve Component troops for annual training.

Active Army troop strength reached approximately 2,000 troops. Installation was ready to receive the first plane load of refugees in accordance with previous instructions; however, the scheduled arrival date was slipped to 2 May 75.

1 May 75

Mr. Donald MacDonald, Senior Civil Coordinator for the Fort Chaffee resettlement program arrived and with BG Cannon participated in a press conference in Little Rock, Arkansas, with Governor David Pryor.

The refugee hospital became operational with a 148 bed capacity.

The 96th CA Bn (-) and the 1st PSYOP Bn(-) arrived from Fort Bragg.

The 720th MP Bn from Fort Hood arrived and commenced operation. Mr. MacDonald briefed 70 correspondents at Fort Chaffee and met with and briefed Fort Smith community leaders. In the evening he met with the mayor, council and assembled citizens of Barling where opposition to the refugee operation proved to be most vocal.

2 May 75

First plane load of 71 refugees arrived at Fort Smith Airport and was greeted by Mr. Donald MacDonald, Governor David Pryor, MG David Ott,

BG James Cannon, Mr. Billy G. Roberts, as well as other municipal and state dignitaries.

The "Helping Hand" newspaper commenced publication for US military and civilians in the task force.

- 4 May 75 Refugee population rose to over 1,000.
- 5 May 75 GSA representative arrived to assist in expediting the receipt of GSA managed supplies, material and equipment.
- 6 May 75 Refugee population reached 2,271.
- 8 May 75 The 1st Cook Company (Provisional) was established.
- 10 May 75 The first Reserve Component (RC) Units arrived for Annual Training.

A severe windstorm hit Tent City at approximately 2100 hours blowing down approximately 60 percent of the tentage.
- 12 May 75 Refugee population reached 20,988.

Ground was broken to initiate construction of the sewage lagoon project.
- 13 May 75 BG Jack V. Mackmull arrived and assumed command of TFNA.
- 17 May 75 Reserve Component Unit population rose to more than 3,000 troops.
- 20 May 75 The Presidential Advisory Committee visited Fort Chaffee and received national attention. Committee dignitaries and guests were Mr. John Eisenhower, Chief, Advisory Committee; Ambassador

Dean Brown, IATF Director; Commissioner Chapman, INS; and Mrs. Julia Taft, IATF/HEW.

The 593d Support Group from Fort Lewis, Washington, arrived with an advance party, and began transition with the 46th Support Group.

21 May 75 Main body of 593d Support Group arrived and completed transition with 46th Support Group which moved to Indiantown Gap to establish a relocation center there.

23 May 75 Over 2,000 refugees had departed Fort Chaffee.

The extract of events only includes major events during organization of Task Force New Arrivals, refugee buildup, impact on Reserve Components, and logistical support for the refugee population.

APPENDIX 3

INITIAL TROOP LIST FOR OPERATION NEW LIFE-CHAFFEE

The troop list extracted from Annex A to OPLAN New Life - Chaffee reflected the following units and their home locations:

43d CS HHC Gp Spt	Fort Carson
20th AG Det Repl	Fort Campbell
524th AG Per Svc Co	Fort Benning
Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg
5th Eng Bn (BT AR (-))	Fort Leonard Wood
471st TC Co Lt Trk	Fort Sill
720 MP Bn HHD	Fort Hood
410 MP Co	Fort Hood
62 CS (S&S) (TY B)	Fort Hood
13th PI Det Fld Svc	Fort Benning
50th PI	Fort Bragg
47th Med Hosp (-) Aug	Fort Sill
TC Mvt Ctl Tm	Fort Bragg
330th Movt Ctl Ctr	Fort Bragg
4th PSYOP	Fort Bragg

This list was modified a number of times during the refugee operation at Fort Chaffee.

APPENDIX 4

ROSTER OF OCCUPATIONS, 213TH S&S BN

<u>Military Job Description</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
Battalion Cdr	Crase	School Superintendent
Executive Officer	Higgins	HS Teacher (Driver Ed)
S4 Logistic O	Wendel	Banker, V.P.
S2-S3	Puariea	Deputy Sheriff
Chaplain	Major	Priest/Univ Dorm Dr
Commo Off	Henzlik	Ins Co Off
S1 Adjutant	Parkinson	SSA Civ Army Tech
Cmd Sgt Major	Backes	Sales, Paper Co.
Pers Staff NCO	Wanek (Crump)	Art Civ Army Tech Asst Principal H.S.
Admin Spec	Larson (Melland)	Teacher MS Hist Heating & AC Svc Tech
Clk Typist	Wienandt	Teachers Aid
Lt Veh Driver	Ackerman	Carpenter
Opns Sgt	Gajewski	Salesman, Bakery
Intel Sgt	Reidl (Patnaude)	Police Sgt Purch Agt Mar Elec
Clk Typist	Parsch	Farmer
Gen Draftsman	Darmody	Teacher HS Soc Studies
Asst S4 Off	Van Duser	Teacher HS PE
Auto Maint Tech	Ohm	Engr St Hwy
Unit Sup Tech	Reissmann	Sta Civ Army Advisor
Bn Mtr Mt Sgt	Schmidt	Drug Sales

<u>Military Job Description</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
Bn Sup Sgt	Bender (Michalik)	Sales Auto Supply Paper Tester
QM Mt Supv-Ins	Peck (Now)	City Sewer Insp Farmer
Sr Sup Spec	Wadzinski (Schlund, M.)	Mach SPO Lumber Auto Mech
Sup Spec	Venske	Paper Tester, Paper Co.
Asst Log Off	Newman	Sanit Engr
Field Svc Off	Mader	Sales, Paper Co
Gen Sup Str Off	Huseby	Teacher HS
Parts Sup Off	Lillge	Ins Rep
Ch Sup Op Sgt	Gianoli	Sheriff
Acft Eq Prt NCO	Marquardt	Ins Cq Estimator
Auto Eq Prt NCO	Graveen, V.	Shipping, Paper Co.
Chem NCO	Frickenstein	US Mail
Elec Eq Prt NCO	Hackbarth, G.	Switchman Tel Co.
GRREG NCO	Roemer	State Voc Rehab
Ldry Renov NCO	Hackbarth, T.	Welder
Movement Spec	Baumann	Cty Driver
Msl. Eq Prt NCO	Ferk (Walters)	Teacher, HS, Soc St Painter
Petroleum NCO	Kaczmarek (Esser)	License Exam Oil Co.
Storage Spec	Glebke (Kolberg)	St Voc Rehab Sales Rep
Sp Eq Prt NCO	Jajewski	Bev Distr
Mach Op Supv	Prahl	Farmer

<u>Military Job Description</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
Sr Mach Op Sp	Schlund, A.	Sales, Farm Mach
Tap Eq Rpmn	Gayon	Lineman Tele Co
Co Cdr	Jones	Lawyer Ins
1st Sgt	Zunker	Dairy Farmer
Dining Fac Mgr	Zientara	Trk Repr & Rent
Supply Sgt	Ravey (Tyler)	Shipping Foreman Student
First Cook	Dahlvig	Unemployed
Unit Clerk	Myszka	Foreman Sawmill
Eq Rpt Clk	Easter	Cheese Proc
Repair Prt Spec	Cunningham	IBM Rep
Whl Veh Rpmn	Merce	Cheese maker
	Alsteen	Laborer Lumber
Commo Chief	Kautza	Tele Co.
Fld Sr Swbd Opr	Pagel (Mielke)	Sears Mgr Elec Tele Co.
Teletype Opr	Driscoll	Prod Machinist
Auto Maint Tech	Wheeler	Maint Shop Spr Army Tech

This data was furnished LTC Lee M. Bradley, the unit evaluator, by Commander 213th S&S Bn during AT-75.

Seven positions were not filled for AT-75, but eleven positions were carried as overstrength positions and are indicated on the roster as being cross-trained.

APPENDIX 5

TEN CLASSES OF SUPPLY*

Classes of Supply Legend

- Class I..... Subsistence
- Class II..... Secondary items of equipment authorized in allowance tables and items of supply, including expendables and consumables.
- Class III.... Fuels and petroleum products
- Class IV..... Construction materials
- Class V..... Munitions
- Class VI..... Personal support items (exchange and shipstore type)
- Class VII.... Major end items of equipment authorized in allowance tables
- Class VIII... Medical materiel and repair parts
- Class IX..... Repair parts (less medical), including expendables and consumables.
- Class X..... Nonmilitary support materiel

Subclassifications of Supply Legend

- A--Air (aviation, aircraft, airdrop equipment)
- (Class I--Food packet, in-flight, individual)
- (Class II--Items of supply and equipment in support of aviation/aircraft)
- (Class III--Petroleum and chemical products used in support of aircraft)
- (Class V--Munitions delivered by aircraft or aircraft weapon systems)
- (Class VII--Major end items of aviation equipment)
- (Class IX--Aircraft repair parts)

* This appendix has been extracted from FM 101-10-2, Appendix A.

B--Ground support materiel

(Includes engineer, quartermaster, and transportation equipment such as water purification equipment, construction equipment, petroleum base laboratory equipment, aerial tramway set, and topographic equipment.)

C--Operational rations

(Includes accessory packet of health and comfort items in meal, combat, individual, or issue of ration supplement sundries pack in conjunction with B ration until post exchange facilities are established.)

D--General-purpose administrative vehicles

(Includes commercial vehicles normally authorized for use in administrative vehicle pools.)

E--General supply items

(Includes those items normally referred to as administrative supplies, such as typing paper, typewriter ribbons, cleaning materials. Also includes maps and publications that are distributed through engineer and AG channels respectively.)

F--Clothing and textiles

(Includes individual and organizational items of clothing and equipment authorized in allowance tables and tentage/tarpaulins authorized in TOE or other media.)

G--Communications-electronics

(Includes signal items such as radio sets, telephone sets, teletypewriter sets, photographic equipment, radar sets, and avionic items.)

H--Bulk petroleum

(Includes those petroleum products that are transported in tankers, liquid-cargo barges, etc., in accordance with petroleum slating procedures.)

V--Packaged bulk fuels

(Includes those containers of 500 gallons or less that have been filled from bulk facilities.)

J--Packaged petroleum

(Contains lubricants, greases, hydraulic fluids, etc., that have been packaged or containerized at the procurement source and are issued through general supply or repair parts channels.)

K--Tactical vehicles

(Includes trucks, truck tractors, trailers, semitrailers, and armored personnel carriers; main battle tanks; self-propelled artillery; recovery vehicles; etc.)

L--Missiles

(Includes guided-missile and rocket systems such as Nike-Hercules, Hawk, Honest John, and Little John.)

M--Weapons

(Includes small arms, artillery, fire control systems, rocket launchers, machineguns, individual air defense weapons, etc.)

N--Special weapons

(Class V--Includes nuclear and thermonuclear munitions)

(Class VII--Includes weapon systems that deliver nuclear munitions)

(Class IX--Includes repair parts for class VII N)

Q--General equipment

(Includes items of equipment (excluding those in subclasses A, B, and F) authorized in authorization and allowance tables such as marine and railway equipment; office equipment; and shower, bath, laundry, and bakery equipment. Basic selection criterion for this equipment versus general supply items concerns maintenance. If maintenance support is required, the item will be considered in this subclass.)

P--Army Security Agency materiel

(Includes that materiel for which Commander, US Army Security Agency, has responsibility. Normally authorized in classified authorization tables. Although Army Security Agency items are electronic, they are identified separately because they do not follow the same supply and maintenance channels as subclass G.)

U--Communication security materiel

(Includes that materiel for which Commander, US Army Strategic Communications Command, has responsibility. This subclass is identified separately from subclass G because of the specialized supply and maintenance requirement.)

R--Refrigerated subsistence

(Consists of two categories of refrigeration--that which is required to be maintained at 0°F. to keep frozen meals and foods for extended periods and that which is to be maintained at approximately 40°F. to keep perishables, such as fruits, vegetables, and eggs, contained in A rations for shorter periods.)

S--Nonrefrigerated subsistence

(Includes items in standard B rations and nonperishable items in A rations.)

T--Industrial supplies

(Includes items of supply generally referred to as parts, common; shop stocks; common hardware; fabrication items; etc.; and generally have a multiplicity of uses. Those items managed by Defense Industrial Supply Center generally apply to this subclass.)

W--Ground

(Class I--Water, when delivered as a supply item)

(Class III--Solid fuels such as coal and coke)

(Class V--Conventional munitions, consisting of chemical, smoke, illuminating, incendiary riot control, and improved conventional munitions.)

X--In Class--indicates no subclass assigned**Z--Chemical**

(Classes II and VII--Includes chemical items such as gas masks, decontaminators, and smoke generators.)

(Class V--Consists of chemical toxic munitions)

(Class IX--Consists of repair parts for classes II and VII
Z)

NOTE. So far as is possible, subclass Alfa designations represent the commodity manager codes used in publications such as SB 700-40. Although the basic DOD guidance allows for multiple subclass designators, only one subclass is proposed for Army use. The Army Master Data File and SB 700-20 are currently being programed to include the class and

subclass of supply on an item-by-item basis. Until all items in the Army Master Data File are identified by the new supply class, the guidance set forth herein should be used by commanders concerned to accomplish this identification task.

APPENDIX 6

UNIT EVALUATOR'S NARRATIVE REMARKS

The 213th S&S Bn is an outstanding unit with high morale, flexibility and dedication which was thoroughly challenged by the unique environment at Fort Chaffee. The unit arrived on the logistical scene with the combined challenge of opening Site Support, Reserves Support, and Refugee Support. The unit actually began to receive and issue supplies on the first day it's advance party was on the ground. The three units assigned to the 213th S&S Bn for AT were all seen for the first time and in some cases had unique organizational structures. These units were melded into a "can do" operational environment with unusual speed. During the first six days on the ground, the unit issued and received 98,465 items of Class II and Class X supplies through multishift 15 hour days. This workload was caused by the dramatic increase of the refugee population from over 8,000 to over 21,000 refugees during that period. During this AT the unit provided Class I, II, V, VII and X support. The unit was logistically operating every day that it had been in camp. It has demonstrated the ability to make day-to-day operational changes both in labor, controls and procedures as missions assigned fluctuated or changed. Battalion Administration is very professional. The initial weekend it was here, the Battalion physically moved the Post QM Clothing Sales Store

across Post. Chain of command and proper delegation of authority are trademarks of this unit and were frequently tested with outstanding results. The esprit de corps of this unit was constantly evident, even within the Battalion Tent Area. Although its tents were twice blown down by area storms, continuous improvements to include bulletin boards, signs, flower boxes, shaving areas, and even a bridge led one to believe that the unit was improving its area for a long tenure. The Bn Command/Logistical briefings were complimented by all. It is unfortunate that an ATT could not be administered during this AT. However, the 213th S&S Bn was thoroughly mission tested during this AT, produced a large amount of work, received compliments from permanent party personnel in all areas of its operations, and is an outstanding unit. I would be proud to be associated with this unit at any future time.

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